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1. See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
2. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 284 (8th ed. 2004).
3. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163-64:
“Comity,” in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor
of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other.  But it is the recognition which one nation
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having
due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or
of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.
4. See Somportex, Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971).
5. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261
[hereinafter VCCR].
6. LUKE T. LEE, CONSULAR LAW AND PRACTICE 26 (2d ed. 1991).
7. Id.
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For over 150 years, the principle of comity has played a crucial role in
American legal jurisprudence in the arena of international law.   Comity is the1
“practice among political entities (as nations, states, or courts of different
jurisdictions), involving . . . mutual recognition of legislative, executive, and
judicial acts.”   At the highest level of generality, comity encourages2
international judicial courtesy and respect for foreign legal values.   With3
regard to interstate relations, it has shaped the uniquely American doctrine of
act of state as well as the international understanding of foreign sovereign
immunity.   Against the backdrop of Cold War diplomacy in the 1960s, comity4
also fostered the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations  (VCCR), a treaty5
that seeks to regulate relations between individual nations and foreign
consular officials.  The VCCR governs diplomatic protocol such as the
establishment and conduct of consular relations and the privileges and
immunities of consular officers and offices from the laws of the “receiving
State” (the country where the foreign consular office has been established).6
Its adoption was arguably “the single most important event in the entire
history of the consular institution.”7
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8. In its entirely, Article 36 states:
1.  With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to nationals of the
sending State:
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the sending State
and to have access to them.  Nationals of the sending State shall have the same freedom
with respect to communication with and access to consular officers of the sending State;
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without
delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a
national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or
is detained in any other manner.  Any communication addressed to the consular post by
the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the said
authorities without delay.  The said authorities shall inform the person concerned
without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph;
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending State who is
in prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond with him and to arrange for
his legal representation.  They shall also have the right to visit any national of the
sending State who is in prison, custody or detention in their district in pursuance of a
judgment.  Nevertheless, consular officers shall refrain from taking action on behalf of
a national who is in prison, custody or detention if he expressly opposes such action.
2.  The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised in conformity with the
laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws
and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded
under this Article are intended.
VCCR, supra note 5, art. 36.
9. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006).  In the fall of 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Medellin v. Texas (06-984).  The Court issued a decision in the spring of 2008.
Medellin v. Texas, 128 S.C. 1346 (2008).  The Court decided certain elements that Sanchez-Llamas left
open—notably holding that Article 36 of the Vienna Convention is not self-executing—while leaving other
issues unresolved.  The next development will likely be a congressional initiative to pass implementing
legislation for Article 36.
10. The “sending State” is the nation of the arrestee; the “receiving State” is the arresting nation.
United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 388 n.3 (6th Cir. 2001).
11. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 336-38.
12. VCCR, supra note 5, art. 36(1)(b).
On an individual scale, notions of comity and reciprocity inspired Article
36 of the VCCR, the most influential provision with respect to private parties.8
 This Article discusses how the 2006 United States Supreme Court Sanchez-
Llamas  decision renders Article 36 functionally irrelevant in American9
courts.  Article 36 governs relations between a sending state’s consulate and
foreign nationals arrested in a receiving state.   The provision proclaims twin10
rights of foreign nationals arrested in signatory countries, of which the United
States is one of some 170 participating nations.   Article 36 first provides that11
“if [the detainee] so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State
shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within
its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison
or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner.”   In other12
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13. Id.
14. PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2005, at 5 (2006), available at http://ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/
pdf/pjim05.pdf.
15. Id.
16. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 371-72 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
17. 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
18. Id. at 373.
words, if a foreign national is detained in another country by the authorities
of that country, the authorities of the receiving state must promptly notify the
consulate of the sending state if the detainee so requests.  Second, “[t]he said
authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under
this sub-paragraph.”   This prong requires the authorities to inform the13
detainee of his underlying right to consular notice.  Therefore, Article 36
confers upon detainees the substantive right of consular notice which it then
vindicates with the procedural requirement that the detaining authorities must
inform said detainees of the right to consular notice.
The right to consular notice under Article 36 has the potential for
widespread impact in the United States given the large number of non-citizens
incarcerated in American correctional facilities.  According to the Department
of Justice, federal and state prisons held over 91,000 non-citizens during
2005.   Non-citizens composed over 10% of the state prison population in14
California, New York, Arizona, and Nevada.   With such a large population15
potentially covered by the provisions of Article 36, it would be reasonable to
assume that the procedures and applications surrounding these rights are
uniform and established.  However, since the United States ratified the VCCR
in 1969, enforcement of Article 36 rights has varied widely from case to case
and from court to court.16
ARTICLE 36 IN THE SUPREME COURT AND THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE
In 1998, almost thirty years after ratification of the VCCR, the Supreme
Court issued its first significant decision regarding the right to consular notice
under Article 36; however, the Court provided few practical guidelines to
American courts concerning the contours of these rights.  The defendant in
Breard v. Greene  was charged with rape and murder allegedly without ever17
being informed of his Article 36 right to consular notice.   In failing to18
intervene in the defendant’s imminent execution, the Court held that it was
“clear that Breard procedurally defaulted his claim, if any, under the Vienna
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19. Id. at 375.
20. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27); Case Concerning Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31).
21. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 352-53 (citations omitted).
22. Id. at 353.
23. Id. at 340.
24. Id.
Convention by failing to raise that claim in the state courts.”   Therefore, the19
Court disposed of the case procedurally without addressing the substantive
merit of foreign nationals’ Article 36 rights.
In 2001 and 2003, two decisions by the International Court of Justice
(ICJ)—the primary judicial organ of the United Nations—attempted to add
teeth to the consular notice provision of Article 36 by holding that an
“effective” judicial remedy is required for violating the right to consular
notice.   These cases, Avena and LaGrand, were later summarized by the20
Supreme Court as follows:
The LaGrand Case and the Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals
were brought before the ICJ by the governments of Germany and Mexico,
respectively, on behalf of several of their nationals facing death sentences in the
United States.  The foreign governments claimed that their nationals had not been
informed of their right to consular notification.  They further argued that application
of the procedural default rule to their nationals’ Vienna Convention claims failed to
give “full effect” to the purposes of the Convention, as required by Article 36.  The
ICJ agreed, explaining that the defendants had procedurally defaulted their claims
“because of the failure of the American authorities to comply with their obligation
under Article 36.”  Application of the procedural default rule in such circumstances,
the ICJ reasoned, “prevented [courts] from attaching any legal significance” to the
fact that the violation of Article 36 kept the foreign governments from assisting in
their nationals’ defense.21
Notwithstanding the ICJ’s interpretation, questions over the body’s
jurisdictional authority to interpret Article 36 for U.S. courts led to fresh
confusion and uncertain import.   Finally, in June 2006, the U.S. Supreme22
Court in Sanchez-Llamas issued an important ruling concerning the contours
of Article 36.  In the consolidated appeal, petitioners Moises Sanchez-Llamas
of Mexico and Mario Bustillo of Honduras alleged they were never informed
of their right to contact their respective consulates after being arrested for
unrelated violent crimes.   Both men asserted that their post-arrest23
incrimination derived at least partly from a lack of consular access.24
Although Sanchez-Llamas has yet to be tested widely in lower courts, the
2008] IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES 793
25. Id. at 337.
26. Id. at 339 (citations omitted):
Along with the Vienna Convention, the United States ratified the Optional Protocol
Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes.  The Optional Protocol provides that
“[d]isputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie within the
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice [(ICJ)],” and allows parties to the
Protocol to bring such disputes before the ICJ.  The United States gave notice of its withdrawal
from the Optional Protocol on March 7, 2005.
27. Id. at 372 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  In the spring of 2008, the Supreme Court issued a ruling in
Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).  It held that the Article 36 of the VCCR is not self-executing.
Id. at 1353.
28. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 337.
29. Id. at 343.
decision seems to defeat any realistic enforcement of the right to consular
notice under Article 36.
Because the text of Article 36 contemplates consular notice in criminal
proceedings, most cases in which the issue arises initially occur at the state
level.  However, Article 36 issues also surface in federal court, primarily in
post-conviction habeas corpus proceedings.  Although Sanchez-Llamas
addresses the application of Article 36 in state court,  federal courts will25
continue to arbitrate Article 36 claims when future defendants file federal
habeas corpus claims that invoke Article 36.
Although the VCCR initially contemplated an interpretative role for the
ICJ, in 2005 the United States withdrew from the Optional Protocol conferring
this authority upon the ICJ.   Acknowledging this recent diplomatic posture26
as well as the historical judicial architecture of the VCCR, Justice Breyer’s
dissent in Sanchez-Llamas apparently reaffirms the self-executing status of
Article 36.27
The Supreme Court granted certiorari for three questions in Sanchez-
Llamas:
First, does Article 36 create rights that defendants may invoke against the detaining
authorities in a criminal trial or in a postconviction proceeding?  Second, does a
violation of Article 36 require suppression of a defendant’s statements to police?
Third, may a State, in a postconviction proceeding, treat a defendant’s Article 36
claim as defaulted because he failed to raise the claim at trial?28
Regarding the first question, although the Court found it “unnecessary to
resolve the question [of] whether the Vienna Convention grants individuals
enforceable rights,”  the practical effect is to do precisely that.  By holding29
that suppression is an inappropriate remedy for Article 36 violations, and that
states can apply their normal procedural default rules to Article 36 violation
794 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:789
30. Id. at 337.
31. VCCR, supra note 5, art. 36(2).
32. Id.
33. In post-conviction hearings, many states follow the general rule in federal habeas cases that “a
defendant who fails to raise a claim on direct appeal is barred from raising the claim on collateral review.
There is an exception [in federal habeas proceedings] if a defendant can demonstrate both ‘cause’ for not
raising the claim at trial, and ‘prejudice’ from not having done so.”  Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 351
(citations omitted).
34. Id. at 358.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 379 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
claims,  the Court made it extremely unlikely that foreign nationals could30
secure a direct and meaningful remedy for Article 36 violations.
Although the language of Article 36 clearly defines the right to consular
access as well as notice of that right, the treaty language itself reveals an
underlying tension over how to enforce these provisions.  Article 36 declares
that its delineated rights “shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and
regulations of the receiving State.”   Yet in other language, this command is31
“subject to the proviso . . . that the said laws and regulations [of the receiving
state] must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights
accorded under this Article are intended.”   Therefore, Article 36 itself fails32
to delineate the extent to which implementation of Article 36 rights must
conform to the domestic law of the receiving state.
The procedural default doctrine is perhaps the principal obstacle to
effective Article 36 violation claims in state court.  Procedural default,
adopted in federal habeas corpus proceedings and followed by many states,
bars a defendant from raising a claim on collateral review that the defendant
failed to raise at trial.   Accordingly, a foreign national who fails to assert an33
Article 36 violation at trial or on appeal may be precluded from subsequently
raising an Article 36 challenge at a post-conviction hearing or habeas corpus
proceeding.   This remains true even if the reason that the defendant did not34
originally assert an Article 36 violation stems from the authorities’ failure to
comply with the notice provision of Article 36.   In other words, a defendant35
can default on an Article 36 claim even if the reason for not raising the claim
was itself the result of an Article 36 violation.36
The dissent in Sanchez-Llamas asserts that this seemingly circular
application of the procedural default doctrine violates the “full effect”
requirement of Article 36.   However, the majority persuasively analogizes37
to the possibility of defendants defaulting on their Miranda rights even though
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38. Id. at 358 (majority opinion).
39. Id. at 357.
40. 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
41. Id. at 375.
42. Id. (citing Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 723 (1988)); Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 700 (1988); Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S.
Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 539 (1987).
43. Id. at 376.
44. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 364 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
the reason for the default itself stemmed from an underlying Miranda
violation.   Finally, the Court identifies differences between the adversarial38
system and the inquisitorial system;  the result is to render the dissenting39
opinion and prior ICJ decisions inapposite.  Taken as a whole, the majority
decision strips Article 36 of any real authority and drastically undermines the
future of the consular notice requirement in U.S. jurisdictions.
Eight years before Sanchez-Llamas, the Court in Breard v. Greene  faced40
a similar challenge over whether Article 36 rights are susceptible to the
forum’s procedural default rules.  There the Court held that Article 36 does
not trump the procedural default doctrine.   First, the Court observed that “it41
has been recognized in international law that, absent a clear and express
statement to the contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State govern the
implementation of the treaty in that State.”   The Court continued that while42
Article 36 is part of a valid federal treaty and therefore the “supreme law of
the land,” even constitutional rights are subject to procedural default.   If43
even constitutional rights are subject to procedural default, it follows that
nothing is immune from this harsh doctrine.  Hence, Article 36 claims are
susceptible to procedural default.
Sanchez-Llamas assumes a foundational baseline that the receiving state’s
“laws and regulations” regulate the meaning of the “full effect” requirement
of Article 36.  That is, the Court held that the “full effect” of Article 36 rights
can and must be vindicated within the framework of the receiving state’s
“laws and regulations.”  By framing the issue in this manner, the Court makes
Article 36 rights subsidiary to state law and state procedure.
Considering the procedural default system adopted in many states, if
defendants fail to raise Article 36 violations at trial or appeal due to the failure
of the authorities to inform them of their Article 36 rights, claims of Article
36 violations will typically be relegated to one component of a post-conviction
ineffective assistance of council claim or as part of a broader challenge to the
voluntariness of a confession.   While it is unclear whether these avenues of44
relief fulfill the “full effect” intended by the drafters of Article 36, Sanchez-
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45. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128, ¶ 134
(Mar. 31).
46. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, ¶ 91 (June 27).
47. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 356-57.
48. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 466 ¶ 91; see also Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 128 ¶ 113.
49. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 466 ¶ 91.
50. The Court also questioned the authority of the ICJ generally in interpreting Article 36:
Nothing in the structure or purpose of the ICJ suggests that its interpretations were intended
to be conclusive on our courts.  The ICJ’s decisions have “no binding force except between the
parties and in respect of that particular case.”  Any interpretation of law the ICJ renders in the
course of resolving particular disputes is thus not binding precedent even as to the ICJ itself;
there is accordingly little reason to think that such interpretations were intended to be
controlling on our courts.  The ICJ’s principal purpose is to arbitrate particular disputes between
national governments.  While each member of the United Nations has agreed to comply with
decisions of the ICJ “in any case to which it is a party,” the Charter’s procedure for
noncompliance—referral to the Security Council by the aggrieved state—contemplates
quintessentially international remedies.”
Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 354-55 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).  Furthermore, the Court
observed that
after [the ICJ decisions], the United States withdrew from the Optional Protocol concerning
Vienna Convention disputes.  Whatever the effect of Avena and LaGrand before this
withdrawal, it is doubtful that our courts should give decisive weight to the interpretation of a
tribunal whose jurisdiction in this area is no longer recognized by the United States.
Llamas leaves room for little else.  To the dissent in Sanchez-Llamas and to
the ICJ in several recent cases, this is unnecessarily dismissive of Article 36.
Whereas the ICJ in Avena  and LaGrand  would require direct application45 46
of Article 36 rights, the Supreme Court in Sanchez-Llamas requires only
subsidiary enforcement according to state-specific forum law,  the result of47
which is an emasculated Article 36.
In 2001, the ICJ confronted the “circular Article 36 violation” problem
discussed above; the international tribunal ruled that procedural default rules
must yield in situations where defendants’ procedural default occurred
“because of the failure of American authorities to comply with their obligation
under Article 36.”   In 2003, the ICJ again held against such application of48
procedural default rules because it “prevented [courts] from attaching any
legal significance” to the fact that underlying Article 36 violations kept the
foreign nationals from securing assistance from their home government.   In49
allowing Article 36 rights to be enforced according to state law and state
procedure, Sanchez-Llamas invokes a different theoretical framework than
that utilized by ICJ to determine the “full effect” of Article 36 rights.  This
baseline disparity results as much from the structure of the American
adversarial system as it does a preference for domestic law over application
of the VCCR.50
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Id. at 355.
51. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 466, ¶¶ 90-91.
52. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 356-57 (citations omitted):
This reasoning overlooks the importance of procedural default rules in an adversary system,
which relies chiefly on the parties to raise significant issues and present them to the courts in
the appropriate manner at the appropriate time for adjudication.  Procedural default rules are
designed to encourage parties to raise their claims promptly and to vindicate “the law’s
important interest in the finality of judgments.”  The consequence of failing to raise a claim for
adjudication at the proper time is generally forfeiture of that claim.  As a result, rules such as
procedural default routinely deny “legal significance”—in the Avena and LaGrand sense—to
otherwise viable legal claims.
See also Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386  (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment) (“Our adversary system is designed around the premise that the parties know what is best for
them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and arguments entitling them to relief.”).
53. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 at 357 (citations omitted).
54. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 466 ¶ 91; Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 128 ¶ 134.
55. Id.
The ICJ concluded that application of the procedural default rule in
certain situations failed to give “full effect” to the purposes of Article 36
because it prevented courts from attaching “legal significance” to the Article
36 violation.   In Sanchez-Llamas, the Supreme Court found this51
interpretation to be in conflict with the basic framework of the American
adversarial system:52
Procedural default rules generally take on greater importance in an adversary
system such as ours than in the sort of magistrate-directed, inquisitorial legal system
characteristic of many of the other countries that are signatories to the Vienna
Convention.  “What makes a system adversarial rather than inquisitorial is . . . the
presence of a judge who does not (as an inquisitor does) conduct the factual and legal
investigation himself, but instead decides on the basis of facts and arguments pro and
con adduced by the parties.”  In an inquisitorial system, the failure to raise a legal
error can in part be attributed to the magistrate, and thus to the state itself.  In our
system, however, the responsibility for failing to raise an issue generally rests with
the parties themselves.53
This analysis reveals what form the “full effect” of Article 36 might take
in an American state court that adheres to a strict procedural default scheme.
With its emphasis on party representation as the primary means of vindicating
one’s rights, the Supreme Court bolsters the notion that an ineffective
assistance of council claim provides the requisite “full effect” to Article 36
rights.  Both LaGrand and Avena dispute that this recourse is adequate.54
Instead, those cases would require that state court procedural default rules
provide a direct remedy for Article 36 violations.   Herein lies what seems to55
be an irreconcilable difference between the approach taken by the ICJ and the
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56. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 357 n.6.
57. Id. at 357, 364 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
58. Id. at 358-59.
59. Id.; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
60. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 358-59.
61. Id. at 359 (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1972)).
Supreme Court in Sanchez-Llamas.  The disparity likely stems from different
legal traditions to which the two courts adhere: the inquisitorial system versus
the adversarial system.
Whereas the ICJ would require a direct judicial remedy to satisfy the “full
effect” mandate of Article 36, the Supreme Court concluded that subsidiary
relief in the form of an ineffective assistance of council claim achieves an
acceptable “full effect.”  In practice, although available procedurally,
defendants would find it substantively difficult to meet the requirements of
this form of relief.  As the Supreme Court identified, “[u]nder our system, an
attorney’s lack of knowledge does not excuse the defendant’s default, unless
the attorney’s overall representation falls below what is required by the Sixth
Amendment.”   Therefore, whereas the ICJ would require a per se remedy for56
any Article 36 violation, the Supreme Court envisions an Article 36 claim as
part of a larger ineffective assistance of council claim based on independent
constitutional guarantees.   This result relates directly to the adversarial57
system’s assumption that attorneys play an integral part in vindicating
individual rights.  Whereas this burden might fall to the state or the judicial
process itself in civil law jurisdictions, in common law jurisdictions attorneys
carry this responsibility.
In dismissing the ICJ’s call for suspending a state’s procedural default
rules in certain situations—situations where the Article 36 violation itself
prevents defendants from becoming aware of their Article 36 rights and
asserting them at trial—the Sanchez-Llamas Court analogizes to the similar
forfeiture of suspect’s rights under Miranda.   Under that line of case law,58
“police are required to advise suspects that they have a right to remain silent
and a right to an attorney.”   If police fail to give such warnings, and counsel59
fails to object to this violation, a suspect may not be aware that he ever had
such rights until after the trial’s conclusion.   “Nevertheless, it is well60
established that where a defendant fails to raise a Miranda claim at trial,
procedural default rules may bar him from raising the claim in a subsequent
postconviction proceeding.”   Accordingly, if the procedural default doctrine61
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62. “It is no slight to the Convention to deny petitioner’s claims under the same principles we would
apply to an Act of Congress, or to the Constitution itself.”  Id. at 360.
63. Id. at 364 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
64. Id. at 364 n.3 (citations omitted):
Furthermore, once [the foreign national in Sanchez-Llamas] became aware of his Vienna
Convention rights, nothing prevented him from raising an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim predicated on his trial counsel’s failure to assert the State’s violation of those rights.
Through such a claim . . . “full effect” could have been given to Article 36, without dishonoring
state procedural rules that are compatible with due process.  [The foreign national in Sanchez-
Llamas] did not include a Vienna-Convention-based, ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim
along with his direct Vienna Convention claim in his initial habeas petition.  He later sought
to amend his petition to add an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, but the court held that
the amendment did not relate back to the initial pleading.  The state court therefore rejected
[the] ineffectiveness claim as barred by the applicable state statute of limitations.  [The
petitioner] did not seek review of that decision in this Court.
65. As the Sanchez-Llamas Court notes, a defendant might also successfully “raise an Article 36
claim as part of a broader challenge to the voluntariness of [the detainee’s] statements to police.”  Id. at 350
(majority opinion).  This, too, however, would relegate Article 36 claims to subsidiary status.
can frustrate even constitutional rights, then it can also hinder lesser rights,
such as those accorded by treaty.62
Justice Ginsburg, concurring in the judgment of Sanchez-Llamas,
observes:
Nothing the State did or omitted to do here “precluded counsel from . . . rais[ing] the
question of a violation of the Vienna Convention in the initial trial.”  Had counsel
done so, the trial court could have made “appropriate accommodations to ensure that
the defendant secure[d], to the extent possible, the benefits of consular assistance.”63
Once again, the action upon which the Court focuses is that of the attorney
rather than the authorities who failed to inform the foreign national of the
underlying Article 36 rights.   This highlights the disparate treatment such an64
inquiry receives under the adversarial system versus the inquisitorial system.
The Court’s analogy between failure to inform foreign nationals of
Article 36 rights and failure to inform defendants of their Miranda rights is
internally consistent.  However, the harm to potential Article 36 claimants
seems particularly harsh considering it is much more likely for an American
attorney to be aware of a suspect’s Miranda rights than of a foreign national’s
Article 36 rights, if indeed the attorney is aware of the VCCR at all.  For this
reason, it is unlikely that a failure to raise an Article 36 violation by itself will
rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel.  More likely, the
defendant foreign national would require additional evidence of Sixth
Amendment deficiency.   Attempts to vindicate the “full effect” for Article65
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66. Id. at 350.
67. United States v. Garcia-Perez, 190 F. App’x 461 (6th Cir. 2006).
68. Commonwealth v. Padilla, No. 13 WAP 2006, slip op. (Ct. of Comm. Pleas of Blair County
Aug. 1, 2006).
69. Garcia-Perez, 190 F. App’x at 462-63.
70. Id. at 463.
36 violations would once again become subsidiary to other, independent bases
of complaint.
PURSUING ARTICLE 36 VIOLATIONS AFTER SANCHEZ-LLAMAS
Considering the harsh result under Sanchez-Llamas, what other
substantive recourse is available for Article 36 violations?  After stripping
Article 36 of meaningful direct judicial enforcement, the Sanchez-Llamas
Court offers the following guidelines on how foreign nationals might address
Article 36 violations:
Finally, suppression is not the only means of vindicating Vienna Convention
rights.  A defendant can raise an Article 36 claim as part of a broader challenge to the
voluntariness of his statements to police.  If he raises an Article 36 violation at trial,
a court can make appropriate accommodations to ensure that the defendant secures,
to the extent possible, the benefits of consular assistance.  Of course, diplomatic
avenues—the primary means of enforcing the Convention—also remain open.66
The Court engages in judicial minimalism by failing to provide any
practical consideration of how these channels might be addressed.  Since not
many trial courts, including very few appellate courts, have yet to face Article
36 claims after Sanchez-Llamas, the impact of the decision is still
undetermined.  However, two decisions in late 2006, just several months after
the Court decided Sanchez-Llamas, shed some light on what the future holds
for Article 36.  The first decision is an unpublished opinion by the Sixth
Circuit.   The second is a case that ultimately reached the Supreme Court of67
Pennsylvania.68
I.  UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-PEREZ
United States v. Garcia-Perez involved a Mexican national facing a
deportation hearing.   The relevant part of the petitioner’s appeal focused on69
the fact that Washington State authorities never informed him of his right to
contact the Mexican consulate pursuant to Article 36.   Since the case arose70
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71. Id. at 466.
72. Id.
73. 268 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2001).
74. Id. at 394.
75. Id. at 384-85.
76. Id. at 389.
77. Id., quoted in Garcia-Perez, 190 F. App’x at 465-66.
78. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 343 (2006).
79. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d at 391 (quoting VCCR, supra note 5, pmbl.).
less than a month after Sanchez-Llamas, the Sixth Circuit first addressed the
recent Supreme Court decision.  The court noted that the Supreme Court
assumed without deciding that the VCCR created individually enforceable
rights.   Therefore, the Supreme Court “did not answer the question of71
whether the [VCCR] created enforceable individual rights.”   In the absence72
of a rule of decision by the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit applied its
existing precedent to resolve the current controversy.
The Sixth Circuit previously held in United States v. Emuegbunam  that73
Article 36 did not “create a right for a detained foreign national to consult
with the diplomatic representatives of his nation that the federal courts can
enforce.”   In Emuegbunam, a Nigerian citizen was arrested for conspiracy74
to import heroin into the United States.   The Emuegbunam court observed75
that international treaties do not generally create privately enforceable rights.76
In Garcia-Perez, the Sixth Circuit offered the following analysis on treaty
obligations generally:
A treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations.  It depends for the
enforcement of its provisions on the interest and honor of the governments which are
parties to it.  If these fail, its infraction becomes the subject of international
negotiations and reclamation, so far as the injured parties choose to seek redress,
which may in the end be enforced by actual war.  It is obvious that with all this the
judicial courts have nothing to do and can give no redress.77
Therefore, the Sixth Circuit characterized Article 36 as granting signatory
nations certain diplomatic rights against other signatory nations.  It rejected
the individually enforceable rights that the Supreme Court in Sanchez-Llamas
“assume[d], without deciding” existed;  rather, it interpreted Article 36 as not78
providing “any judicially enforceable right of consultation between a detained
foreign national and the consular representatives of his nation.”   The Sixth79
Circuit in Emuegbunam cited the preamble of the VCCR in support of its
holding: “[T]he purpose of such privileges and immunities is not to benefit
individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of functions by consular
802 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:789
80. Id. at 392.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 343 (2006).
84. Id. at 350-51.
85. Id. at 346.
86. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
87. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 346.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 346-47 (citations omitted):
And where a treaty provides for a particular judicial remedy, there is no issue of intruding on
the constitutional prerogatives of the States or the other federal branches.  Courts must apply
the remedy as a requirement of federal law.  But where a treaty does not provide a particular
remedy, either expressly or implicitly, it is not for the federal courts to impose one on the States
posts on behalf of their respective States.”   Therefore, contracting states80
have merely granted rights to each other; informing detainees of their “right”
to consular notice has simply been a means of implementing these treaty
obligations between the states.   The Sixth Circuit also noted the position of81
the State Department that the VCCR “does not create individual rights.”82
By holding that Article 36 does not confer any individual rights, the Sixth
Circuit did what the Supreme Court in Sanchez-Llamas was unwilling to do:
mount a substantive attack on Article 36.  Because Sanchez-Llamas ultimately
failed to decide whether Article 36 created individually enforceable rights,83
the Sixth Circuit holding that it does not create such rights was a permissible
interpretation.  The holding also injected an institutional competency
argument into the Article 36 debate, which the Supreme Court previously
alluded to when it addressed proper techniques for vindicating Article 36
rights.84
The VCCR, as a valid treaty, “binds the States pursuant to the Supremacy
Clause, and . . . the States therefore must recognize the force of the treaty in
the course of adjudicating the rights of litigants.”   Under the Federal85
Constitution, the President has the power, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, to enter into international treaties.   When the United States ratified86
the VCCR, it did so “with the expectation that it would be interpreted
according to its terms.”   Therefore, the Court’s authority to create a “judicial87
remedy applicable in state court must lie, if anywhere, in the treaty itself.”88
Inferentially, the Court deemed a judicial remedy inappropriate given the
absence of remedial language in the treaty itself.
The Supreme Court has thus made it effectively irrelevant whether Article
36 creates individually enforceable rights since there is no potential remedy.
In Sanchez-Llamas, the Supreme Court implicitly addressed  the institutional89
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through lawmaking of their own.
Id. at 350:
Finally, suppression is not the only means of vindicating Vienna Convention rights.  A
defendant can raise an Article 36 claim as part of a broader challenge to the voluntariness of
his statements to police.  If he raises an Article 36 violation at trial, a court can make
appropriate accommodations to ensure that the defendant secures, to the extent possible, the
benefits of consular assistance.  Of course, diplomatic avenues—the primary means of
enforcing the Convention—also remain open.
90. Under this view, the contracting VCCR states are granting each other rights vis-à-vis their
executive branches.  See United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 392 (6th Cir. 2001).
91. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 355 (“Although the United States has agreed to ‘discharge its
international obligations’ in having state courts give effect to the decision in Avena, it has not taken the
view that the ICJ’s interpretation of Article 36 is binding on our courts.”  (citations omitted)).  In its 2008
term, the Supreme Court decided Medellin v. Texas, 128 S.C. 1346 (2008).  The Court held that Article 36
is not self-executing, reasoning that the Vienna Treaty requires implementing legislation for enforcement.
92. See Commonwealth v. Padilla, 908 A.2d 265 (Pa. 2006) (mem.) (per curiam).
93. Id.
94. Id.
competency concerns that the Sixth Circuit in Emuegbunam explicitly
addressed.   Even if courts are wary of usurping their boundaries of90
institutional competency, they might feel comfortable addressing the import
of Article 36 in light of the President’s ambivalent declaration that the United
States will “discharge its international obligations” under the VCCR.91
II.  COMMONWEALTH V. PADILLA
A second post-Sanchez-Llamas case to address Article 36 derives from
state court.  In August of 2006, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
entertained its first appellate level challenge to Article 36 after Sanchez-
Llamas.   Commonwealth v. Padilla is informative because of the procedural92
posture in which the Article 36 claim arose.  In Padilla, a Mexican national
was charged with triple homicide and other violations.   In contrast to the93
other cases addressed thus far, the Article 36 claim in Padilla arose before
trial.   Therefore, rather than focusing on procedural default and other post-94
conviction proceedings, the case offers insight into how an Article 36 claim
might proceed before or during trial.
As the case reveals, Article 36 claims often arise in trial courts
completely unfamiliar with the VCCR.  The actions of the trial court in
Padilla underscore the obstacles an Article 36 claimant faces when seeking
recognition of Article 36 rights in such a “foreign” environment.  Because
Sanchez-Llamas effectively eliminates post-conviction remedies for Article
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95. Commonwealth v. Padilla, No. 13 WAP 2006, slip op. at 3 (Ct. of Comm. Pleas of Blair County
Aug. 1, 2006).
96. Id.
97. Padilla, 908 A.2d 265.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. The Commonwealth noted in its reply to Mexico’s application for stay that the U.S. Supreme
Court in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon recently interpreted the VCCR as “not guarantee[ing] defendants any
assistance at all.  The provision secures only a right of foreign nationals to have their consulate informed
36 violations, when recognition of these rights falters at the trial court level,
the obstacles encountered in Padilla risk becoming irremediable.
In Padilla, the defendant was a Mexican national who faced capital
homicide charges in connection with a shooting in Blair County,
Pennsylvania.   Article 36 became an issue when Mexico became aware that95
the defendant Mexican national was potentially facing the death penalty;
Mexico then attempted to intervene on his behalf.   Although this procedural96
posture strays from the “consular notice” scenario found in Sanchez-
Llamas—that is, rather than the foreign national attempting to invoke his
Article 36 rights, it is the foreign government attempting to perform its Article
36 duties—it nonetheless illustrates how state trials courts confront Article 36
issues generally.
Padilla involved two separate issues before the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania.  The first was an appeal by Mexico of an order by the trial court
prohibiting its involvement in the defendant’s trial.   Mexico then sought an97
application for stay to postpone the trial until the Court could resolve the
parties’ underlying Article 36 rights.   In a decision without a published98
opinion, the Court quashed the underlying appeal as interlocutory and
dismissed as moot the Emergency Application for Stay.   The result was99
similar to that predicted by Sanchez-Llamas in that any potential Article 36
violations in Padilla were relegated to subsidiary post-conviction claim status.
Although the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Padilla did not publish an
opinion with its decision, what follows is a hypothetical analysis (in the form
of a memorandum) in which the court might have engaged, or how a similar
court might address a comparable situation.
HYPOTHETICAL ARTICLE 36 MEMORANDUM ANALYSIS IN PADILLA
Pursuant to the VCCR and the Consular Convention between the United
Mexican States and the United States of America (U.S.-Mexico Convention),
the Mexican Government attempted to intervene on Mr. Padilla’s behalf.100
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of their arrest or detention—not to have their consulate intervene, or to have law enforcement authorities
cease their investigation pending any such notice or intervention.”  Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S.
331, 349 (2006).  However, Sanchez-Llamas is distinguishable from the current case because the Supreme
Court only addressed the rights of the defendant and only in the context of consular notification.  The
Commonwealth ignores the language of the VCCR granting the sending state, as opposed to the defendant,
the right to “intervene”:
[C]onsular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending State who is in prison,
custody or detention, to converse and correspond with him and to arrange for his legal
representation.  They shall also have the right to visit any national of the sending State who is
in prison, custody or detention in their district in pursuance of a judgment.  Nevertheless,
consular officers shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a national who is in prison,
custody or detention if he expressly opposes such action.
VCCR, supra note 5, art. 36, § 1(c).  Separate from the VCCR, the U.S.-Mexico Convention apparently
contemplates an avenue for the sending state to address the authorities of the receiving state:
Consular officers of either High Contracting Party may, within their respective consular
districts, address the authorities, National, State, Provincial or Municipal, for the purpose of
protecting the nationals of the State by which they were appointed in the enjoyment of rights
accruing by treaty or otherwise.  Complaint may be made for the infraction of those rights.
Consular Convention Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States, U.S.-Mex.,
Aug. 12, 1942, art. VI, § 1, 57 Stat. 800, 125 U.N.T.S. 302.
101. Although the United States in 2005 withdrew from the Optional Protocol of the VCCR that
granted the International Criminal Court limited jurisdiction in capital cases, other aspects of the VCCR
remain in force.  Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 338-39.  The Court in Sanchez-Llamas held that suppression
is an inappropriate remedy for VCCR violations and that states may apply their regular procedural default
rules to VCCR claims.  Id. at 358-59.  Mexico is apparently still allowed to offer “consular assistance” and
perform various consultation functions.  It is considerably less clear whether Mexico is entitled to
independently address the court and provide courtroom assistance concurrent to representation by approved
counsel of record. 
102. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n v. Process Gas Consumers Group, 467 A.2d 805, 808-09 (Pa. 1983).
103. It should be noted that the “requirement that the applicant for a stay show that it is likely he will
prevail on the merits should not be an inflexible rule.  This criterion must be considered and weighed
relative to the other three criteria.”  Id. at 809 n.8.  Petitioner will have an opportunity to address the merits
of alleged VCCR and treaty violations when the case is submitted on briefs.
After several attempts by Mexico to address the trial court concerning
Mr. Padilla’s rights, the Court of Common Pleas issued an order on May 18,
2006, preventing the Mexican Government from addressing the court in any
capacity.  Mexico appealed and we asked the parties to submit briefs
concerning Mexico’s attempted court intervention.   Meanwhile, trial court101
proceedings continued, with the trial set to begin the week before briefs are
due in this Court on the pending appeal.  Instantly, Mexico asks for a stay of
the trial court proceedings.
In considering an application for stay, the following four prongs must be
met:102
(1) The petitioner makes a strong showing that he is likely to prevail on
the merits;103
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104. Commonwealth v. Quaranibal, 763 A.2d 941, 944 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
105. See id.
106. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 360.
107. Quaranibal, 763 A.2d at 944.
108. At a glance, 210 PA. CODE § 1701(a) (2004) seems to invite application here.  It reads as
follows: “Except as otherwise prescribed by these rules, after an appeal is taken or review of a quasijudicial
order is sought, the trial court or other government unit may no longer proceed further in the matter.”  While
Mexico asserts that Mr. Padilla seeks its assistance in addressing Blair County authorities, Brief for
Petitioner at 7, Mexico itself, nevertheless, is not counsel of record and is not currently a party to the case.
Commonwealth v. Padilla, No. 05 CR 2273, slip op. at 5-6 (Ct. of Com. Pleas of Blair County May 18,
2006).  Mexico cites Commonwealth v. Hall, 476 A.2d 7, 9 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984), in support of its reliance
on § 1701(a).  However, Hall involved a defendant who filed a pro se appeal.  In contrast, here, Mr. Padilla
has not filed an appeal on his own behalf, either through counsel of record or pro se.  After a search of case
law, there is no indication that an appeal by a non-party triggers automatic stay under § 1701(a).  It is also
(2) The petitioner has shown that without the requested relief, he will
suffer irreparable injury;
(3) The issuance of a stay will not substantially harm other interested
parties in the proceedings; and
(4) The issuance of a stay will not adversely affect the public interest.
Petitioner fails to satisfy at least the second prong of the test, that of
irreparable injury.  Perhaps unfortunate from the perspective of judicial
economy considering the proximity of the appeal to the trial, claims of alleged
VCCR and U.S.-Mexico Convention violations can nevertheless be raised on
appeal or in a subsequent ineffective assistance of counsel proceeding.104
Although it remains possible that both Mexico and Mr. Padilla have legitimate
treaty grievances, neither party risks irreparable harm if the trial proceeds.105
In Sanchez-Llamas, the United States Supreme Court held that procedural
default rules apply to defendants who fail to raise alleged VCCR violations in
state court and later attempt to raise them at the federal level.   However, the106
risk of procedural default does not appear to be implicated in this case, which
indicates a lack of irreparable harm.  Through its pending appeal, Mexico has
provided Mr. Padilla with actual notice of potential treaty violations,
violations that Mr. Padilla presumably could raise through his own counsel or,
if counsel fails to do so, as part of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
at a subsequent post-conviction hearing.  In one of the few appellate level
cases in Pennsylvania addressing alleged VCCR violations, the superior court
noted that an issue is waived only if a defendant could have raised an issue but
failed to do so either before trial, at trial, on direct appeal, or during a post-
conviction proceeding.   Therefore, even after trial, Mexico and Mr. Padilla107
will still be able to seek relief for alleged VCCR violations.  Accordingly, the
application for stay cannot be said to establish irreparable harm.108
2008] IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES 807
unclear whether Mexico seeks to intervene pursuant to state procedural rules or merely on an independent
basis pursuant to treaty.  These issues will likely be addressed on appeal.
109. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 350 (2006).
110. Commonwealth v. Padilla, No. 13 WAP 2006, slip op. at 7 (Ct. of Comm. Pleas of Blair County
Aug. 1, 2006).
111. Commonwealth v. Padilla, 908 A.2d 265 (2006).
112. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 350.
113. Id. at 343.
114. United States v. Garcia-Perez, 190 F. App’x 461, 464 (6th Cir. 2006); see also United States
v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 394 (6th Cir. 2001).
115. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 360.
116. Id. at 350:
Leaving aside the suggestion that it is the role of police generally to advise defendants of
their legal options, we think other constitutional and statutory requirements effectively protect
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Sanchez-Llamas envisioned the possibility of
defendants raising Article 36 violations at trial, a time it felt that courts could
still “make appropriate accommodations to ensure that the defendant secures,
to the extent possible, the benefits of consular assistance.”   However, as109
Padilla and the hypothetical analysis of the case above illustrate, trial courts
are sometimes unaware of Article 36 or unwilling to even entertain alleged
violations.   The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania implicitly approved of this110
“Article 36 ignorance” at the trial court level.   It seems that the hypothetical111
analysis offered above includes the most viable option that remains open to
pursue Article 36 violations in the face of an obstinate trial court.  That is,
Article 36 claims must be resigned to broader post-conviction proceedings,
namely in the form of ineffective assistance of counsel proceedings or
challenges to overall voluntariness.112
Because Sanchez-Llamas merely “assume[d], without deciding”  that113
the VCCR creates individually enforceable rights, Article 36 enforcement is
left to individual states and individual courts.  One possibility is what
occurred in the Sixth Circuit, where the court recently sanctioned a previous
determination that no such rights exist.   Another result follows from114
Padilla, where a court apparently decided that Article 36 violations, even if
enforceable, are not cognizable until incorporated into a broader post-
conviction challenge.  While the Supreme Court reassures that such
subordinate opportunity for Article 36 relief is “no slight to the
Convention,”  it seems unlikely that Article 36 will command anything more115
than indirect judicial recognition in the future.116
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the interests served, in Sanchez-Llamas’ view, by Article 36.  A foreign national detained on
suspicion of crime, like anyone else in our country, enjoys under our system the protections of
the Due Process Clause.  Among other things, he is entitled to an attorney, and is protected
against compelled self-incrimination.  Article 36 adds little to these “legal options,” and we
think it unnecessary to apply the exclusionary rule where other constitutional and statutory
protections . . . safeguard the same interests Sanchez-Llamas claims are advanced by Article
36.
117. 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
118. Id. at 1373-75.
The Supreme Court remains actively involved in the subject, as evidenced
by its recent decision in Medellin v. Texas.   Although the Court determined117
that Article 36 is not self-executing, it left the door open to legislative support,
which could be the next chapter in this ongoing history.   If Article 36 is to118
command general respect by U.S. authorities and enjoy widespread
enforcement in U.S. courts, Congress would probably need to pass
implementing legislation.  After Medellin, this might lead to more uniform
interpretation and encourage nationwide respect to Article 36 rights.  While
comity is characterized by the informal process of extending international
courtesy, perhaps Article 36 would benefit from formal federalization.
Heightened formality, while perhaps varying the international posture of the
treaty, might lead to greater respect for the values the VCCR seeks to instill.
It might also encourage reciprocal protection when Americans abroad find
themselves detained by foreign governments.  The goal of protecting
Americans throughout the world could be advanced by protecting
internationals within our own country.  One would hope that a policy
protecting Americans citizens throughout the world would not encounter
internal resistance from any branch of our own government.
